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INVESTIGATIONS INTO A POTENTIAL "LASER-NASP"
TRANSPORT TECHNOLOGY
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RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
In this fourth year of the "Apollo Lightcraft Project" at RPI, the following question is asked of laser-
boosted spacecraft technology: Can this technology also be used to replace domestic and international
jet flights? Clearly, if laser propulsion technology is less polluting than present jet transports, then it could
become a major element in helping to reduce the problem of global warming. Also, ff IJghtcraft (or
"iaser-NASP _) engines can be designed around solar satellite power sources and renewable propellants
(e.g., air, LH2, LNz, HzO, etc.), then an enormous savings in hydrocarbon resources would be realizable.
This 1989-1990 annual report on RPI's design project begins with a first-order economic analysis of
just such a beam-powered global tt-axsi_rt system--based upon a fleet of 10,000 IJghtcraft, designed
to carry one, two, or five passengers in mininaum _olume capsules. A detailed conceptual design is pre-
sented for an on-place Mercury Lightcraft; other designs are briefly explored for larger, IS-place Executive
Lightcraft, and 150- to 350-passenger Jumbo Lightcraft.
Various other teams in the class conducted experiments or performed theoretical analyses on various
aspects of the Lightcraft propulsive engine and vt-hicle technology. One group machined an accurate,
6"Miameter model of the hypersonic air inlet (using a CNC lathe), instrumented it with PCB pressure
transducers, and tested it from Mach 10 to 25 in RPI's hypersonic shock tunnel. Another group simulated
the inlet aerodynamic performance with a computational fluid dynamic (CFD) code called PARC 2D.
Analytically predicted shock positions and pressure distributions were then compared with Schlieren
photographs and pressure data taken during the experiment.
One other group designed a laser propulsion experiment that will be carried out by the 1990-1991
design class. Another designed superconducting magnets for the laser-heated MHD-Fanjet engine, which
accelerates a Lightcraft from Mach 10 to orbital velocity. Others built and tested a l-I/4"-diameter
Lightcraft inlet in RPI's Mach 3 wind tunnel, and analyzed the performance of the primar3' optics of
a Mercury Lightcraft. Perhaps the most profound analytical achievement was the analysis of a laser-heated,
rocket-driven MHD generator using 20,000qK hydrogen as the working fluid; the method employed a
combined simultaneous solution of a quasi-1 I) Mill ) c_Me gfth a 31) radiation code.
In summary, the class design team made exctT_tit)nal progrcm in continuing to climb the steep learning
curve on Laser-propelled flight/tr'axslx_rt technology.
INTRODUCTION
Technological innovation has repeatedly caused drastic
revolutions in world travel patterns. The schooner, steamship,
dirigible, and airplane all had their profound effects. Here we
present an economic analysis of yet another new tr'atsI_rt
mode that will make the advances of these former modes seem
like microscopic progress. We are talking about the Apollo
Lightcraft, a technology that will allow people to travel half-
way around the world, essentially door-to-door in 45 minutes.
It will make trips possible that simply cannot be made today
except by astronauts. And our economic analysis tends to show
that the operating and capital costs of this system can be
recovered once the Lightcraft technology is mature.
BACKGROUND
It is well recognized that mankind's quest for increased
speed has not yet abated, not even with the introduction of
the supersonic Concorde. In fact, the Concorde has merely
whetted our appetite for faster, futuristic flight. People want
to reach their destination as quickly as possible. Two recent
proposals have heightened our interest in travel time savings:
the High Speed Civil Ttmxslx_rt (HSCT) and the Hypersonic
Aircraft (HA) O ). The HSCT is the next step in the development
of supersonic transports and the Hypersonic Aircraft is a jump
beyond the HSCT The HSCT is much closer to today's
technology, and advanced studies have been conducted on the
marketability of this technology in the growing international
trarmportatlon market ( 2,3,4.5,6.-'.8 )
But these advances in high speed transport technology have
generated an interesting dilemma--namely, while the systems
must be cost effective to bc saleable, increasing ,_eed also
increases costs. This "Catch-22" is readily apparent when
considering the HSCT While it has been proposed that the
HSCT needs a range of at least 7500 n.m. to be profitable (the
range of current 747-400 technology), at this range and at
Math 2.5, it requires twice the fuel of the 747 to carry the
same number of passengers, and at Math 3.5 it needs nearly
four times the fuel. It seems that as range increases, fuel
requirements grow at an exponential rate (see Fig. 1 )_9).
Clearly the success of the HSCT and other super- or
hypersonic transports is dependent on an ability to produce
these travel-time savings. Fuel consumption is a major problem,
but the real trouble is that the time savings can only be pushed
to a certain limit, beyond which access and egress times (i.e.,
the times spent going to and from the airports) become the
real liability. Also, since supersonic speeds are possible only
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over water, only certain city pairs can benefit from the time
savings that can be achieved. The inability to fly supersonic
over land also has serious impacts on flight paths. A flight from
Paris to Tokyo, for example, requires either a subsonic track
over land, or an extended diversion to fly completely over
water. Moreover, travel becomes complicated as more
changeovers at intermediate airports become necessary.
For these reasons, while the HSCT may increase flight speed
over water by a factor of three, it may reduce overall travel
time by only 50% or less. Note that the over-water flight time
is not total travel time, but merely over-water air time; over-
land air time and access and _ times are additional. This
becomes quite important when one considers how many
airports will be capable of supporting an HSCT system. If an
HSCT network is only partially implemented, access and egress
times to HSCT port cities could be quite long. This inability
to effect major travel time savings will clearly limit the
marketability of the HSCT and other such super- or hypersonic
_rt.
HSCT proponents hope to capture the top 25% of the
international travel market in spite of these limitations. And
they think they can do this in spite of what they expect to
be a 30% differential in fares. Helping the HSCT is an
assumption that the reduced travel times will stimulate
demand. Historically, reduced travel times have stimulated
travel by a factor of 1.25 to 1.5 (5).
APOLLO LIGHTCRAFT TECHNOLOGY
The real question is not whether the HSCT (or some other
high speed transport) can be developed in the near term, but
how much longer we will or should continue to base future
air transport schemes on large aircraft and fossil fuels. This is
where the Apollo Lightcraft technology fits in(10,]l,12) The
Lightcraft (see Fig. 2) is not an extension of current aircraft
into the next century, but a categorically different technology
because of many unique features. First, and most obviously, a
Lightcraft has a propulsion system that is not powered by fossil-
fuels. It uses laser beams transmitted from satellite solar power
stations (SPS) (13,j4), for the propulsive energy source (see Fig.
3). Size is another difference. A Lightcraft is designed to carry
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Fig. 2. Family of Laser Boosted Lightcraft( _1)
Fig. 3. 7 GWc _tellite SolarPower Station
only one to five persons. Second, it is designed to take off and
land from any airport equipped with a IJghtcraft landing pad
(see Fig. 4). Third, its range is unlimited. In fact, it becomes
more cost effective the further it travels. Unlike the HSCT and
hypersonic aircraft, it does not cart 3' its own energy source,
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and does not need exponential fuel increases to increase range.
Most of its flight is exoatmospheric, and its reentry is per-
formed much like the shuttle (see Fig. 5). Fourth, a Lightcraft
not only minimizes inflight travel time, but also access and
egress times. The result is that total travel time is dramatically
reduced, so much so for long trips that no data presently exist
to suggest how profound the effect will be. Fifth, a Lightcraft
is not dependent on fossil fuels. Its electricity needs can be
provided by large solar power stations (SPS) positioned in
geostationary orbit.
PROJECTION OF FUTURE DEMAND
The projectons of Lightcraft demand presented here a_ume
that the technology will compete with the HSCT and, over
time, successfully capture a certain percentage of that
marketplace. They also assume that Lightcraft system fares will
be competitive with the HSCT and that network travel times
will be at least as short if not shorter.
We expect the rate of penetration will be slow at first (see
Fig. 6) then grow more rapidly as the technology becomes
accepted, and finally stabilize at 25% of the marketplace. We
assume 20 years will be required to accomplish this, both
because the Lightcraft is an entirely new technology that will
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require an extended public acceptance time and because the
support infrastructure for the Lightcraft s3_tcm will take time
to complete.
Given this market penetration curve (i.e., Fig. 6) and
projections of HSCT demand, ridership for the i.ightcraft
system can be estimated (see Table 1 ). We have considered
two scenarios. In scenario A, it is assumed that the IJghtcraft
system will capture 25% of the HSCT ridership projected by
Wasiuta (7>. (This HSCT ridership projection calls for a
compounded 4%/year growth in long-distance air travel until
2015. To be conservative we have assumed no growth
thereafter.) In scenario B, an additional stimulation factor of
2.5 has been applied (to the total long-distance ridership
estimate) based on the time _vings the lJghtcraft _tem will
produce.
To ensure that the scenario B estimate is not unrealistic, a
cross-check has been made, based on a top-down analysis
starting from world population figures. Details on this scenario
C are given in Table 2. The analysis year is 2015 (Year 0 for
the market penetration curve) when the world population will
be approximately .seven billion. Table 2 first shows that atxmt
1.56 trips over 4000 miles will be generated by a typical 4
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Table 1. laghtcraft Rtwcnue Estimates ( 1989 dollars )
Pica.sure
Long Short
Business
Trips/year/household
Person/trip/household
Person-trips/yr/hh.
% over 4000 miles
Person trip> 4000 mi/hh
Total person trips ovcr
4000 miles per household
World population
No. (ffhouseholcLs
%-hh involved
Person-trip/yr over 4000 mi
Person-trip/day over 4000 mi
Implied trip expansion factor
3 1o 30
4 2 1
12 20 30
3% 3% 2%
0.36 0,6 0.6
= 156 pa.,.;s./family
--7,000,O(X),O00
1,750,000,0(F0
2%
54,('_0,(X)0
149,600
2.5
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Table 2. Calculations for Scenario C
Year Dvrsn (%) Revenue A PV of A Revenue B PV of B
! 1.38 $217 $20 $543 $50
2 5.39 $850 $71 $2,126 $178
3 11.73 $1,849 $141 $4,623 $353
4 19.89 $3,136 $217 $7,840 $544
5 29.18 $4,618 $291 $11,544 $728
6 39.28 $6,194 $355 $15,486 $887
7 49.29 $7,773 $405 $19,432 $1,012
8 58.81 $9,274 $439 $23,184 $1,098
9 67.46 $10,637 $458 |26,592 $1,145
10 74.99 $11,825 $463 $29,562 $1,157
11 81.31 $12,821 $456 $32,052 $1,141
12 86.41 $13,625 $441 $34,063 $1,102
13 90.39 $14,253 $419 $35,632 $1,048
14 93.39 $14,726 $394 $36,814 $984
15 95.58 $15,071 $366 $37,677 $916
16 97.12 $15,314 $338 $38,286 $846
17 98.18 $15,481 $311 $38,702 $777
18 98.88 $15,591 $285 $38,978 $712
19 99.33 $15,662 $260 $39,155 $650
20 100.00 $15,768 $238 $39,420 $595
Total $204,684 $6369 $5 i 1,709 $15,923
person household. With world population at 7 billion
(implying 1.75 billion such households), and with 2% of these
households making such trips, the number of person-trips per
year over 4000 miles is estimated to be 54.6 million. On a
daily basis, this is 149,600 trips. Compared with the total long-
distance air travel projections presented (7), this implies a trip
expansion factor of 2.5. While these estimates are crude, they
do show that scenario B is not impossible, and, if the jumps
in ridership seen in the past repeat themselves, a growth factor
of 2.5 may occur, given the time savings that the Lightcraft
system will produce.
To estimate annual revenues, we have taken the ridership
estimates presented in Table 1 and multiplied by $0.12 per
passenger mile, a revenue estimate that has been used in the
HSCT analyses (7). We have also assumed an average trip length
of 5000 miles.
To estimate the net present value of these revenues, for
either scenario A or B, a discount rate of 21096 has been used,
as is typical for somewhat risky investment opportunities and/
or programs involving the use of governmental funds. Under
scenario A, the net present value of the revenues is thus $204
billion in 1989 dollars; for scenario B, it is $511 billion.
STRUCTURE OF THE UGI-ITCRAFI _ INDUSTRY
We foresee a commercialization of the Lightcraft network
similar to that of the present automobile rental industry for
the following reasons. First, Lightcraft will tend to be used like
rental c_.rs. Small groups of people will use them on an
occasional basis to make very long distance trips. Table 2
suggests that for scenario C (described earlier) only 1.566
passenger trips per year will be generated on average by the
typical four-member Lightcraft-user household. At this rate,
only a few households will use them enough to justiTy owning
them privately.
Second, Lightcraft will be very different from existing wide
body aircraft, more closely resembling the family car; thus
airlines axe not likely to be interested in them. Economies of
scale due to vehicle size, to which the airlines have become
accustomed, simply will not exist. In fact, since Lightcraft will
be able to take off and land at virtually any airport, (te., any
one equipped with a proper vertipad) the Lightcraft network
will effectively become a long-distance, high-speed extension
of the present private (auto) transportation system. Third, the
capital cost of a Lightcraft will be high. Relative to the cost
of a present-day commercial airplane, Lightcraft will be in-
expensive, having a cost per pound about on par with
corporate business jets (see discussion below), mainly due to
the fact that a Lightcraft will not have to carry its own
propulsion plant. (It will usually be a capsule moved by
efficient beamed-energy engines around the planet and/or into
space.) But, nonetheless, corporate, rather than private,
individual financing will probably be requited to purchase
them, and rental companies will be well poised to arrange for
such financing.
SUPPLY ANALYSIS
In the supply analysis, we have attempted to determine the
net present value of the costs of creating and operating the
Hghtcraft system over a 20-year time horizon (2015 to 2035).
This is the timeframe over which implementation of the system
is expected.
We have assumed that remote energy sources (i.e., SPSs ) will
be available to power the Lightcraft system, that 500 will
eventually be required, and that the vehicle technology will
alreadybe mature.
The cost analysis was accomplished by estimating capital
expenditures and then analyzing operating costs. The operating
cost of a Lightcraft depends basically on the beamed energy
reqttirement plus a small quantity of liquid hydrogen needed
for energy conversion during laser boost. It should be noted
that very little hydrogen is needed on short endoatmospberic
flights where the Lightcraft does not reach hypersonic
velocities. In addition to the energy requirements, maintenance
expenditures will be required, but this is covered in the capital
costs. In theory, the Lightcraft should have a low maintenance
cost because of its combined-cycle engine, which has no
moving parts. One sensitive area is the large receptive laser
mirror, which may require maintenance of its adaptive surface
actuators, or repair of minor scratches or marring of the
surface.
For purposes of this analysis, the assumed cost for the liquid
hydrogen is $975 for a five-person Lightca-aft traveling half-way
around the globe. This number is based on 1987 dollar values
for liquid hydrogen. It has been suggested that liquid hydrogen
prices will decrease with increased demand (especially if the
"hydrogen economy" materializes). This is one of the founding
philosophies behind the push for hypersonic transport, where
it has been assumed that fuel prices will be cut in half. The
present study assumes that liquid hydrogen prices will remain
at their 1987 levels. The price used for electricity is $.017/
kWh, from estimates for the SPS electric power sources
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mentioned previously. It includes price surcharges that would
be added to the base kWh charge to account for fluctuations
in demand.
Table 3 shows a chart of the energy and hydrogen costs for
various trip lengths in the three different Lightcralt sizes.
Obviously, these data are an estimation of costs at the prices
mentioned above. The costs incorporate predicted losses in the
conversion of electricity into laser light at the power source.
Also, they represent a linear extrapolation of cost for a trip
to the farthest point on Earth in the five-person Apollo
Lightcraft. The linear reduction in cost with decreasing trip
length is a conservative projection because the costs for the
12,000-mile trip are actually those required for the Apollo
Lightcraft to achieve orbit; thus any of the shorter missions will
not need more hydrogen, and will require considerably less
electricity than a linear extrapolation. As far as the vehicle sizes
are concerned, the two-person "Gemini" vehicle (see Fig. 2)
is estimated to need 1/2 the energy of the five-person vehicle
(as opposed to 2/5 based on the number of passengers).
Similarly, the single-passenger Mercury unit is assumed to
require 1/3, instead of 1/5. Obviously, these assumptions are
based on the increased efficiency of carrying more passengers
in a single vehicle, since the payload is only 9% of the takeoff
weight for the largest Lightcraft. It should be noted, however,
that this logic cannot be extended indefinitely. In fact,
calculations have shown that a five-person Apollo vehicle is
close to being the largest feasible craft due to the 2.5-GW
propulsive laser beam needed from a 7-GW SPS with a 40%
efficient laser and 90% beam transmission efficiency. Addition-
ally, these direct operating costs include a $100 landing fee
per flight.
Table 3. Energy Costs for Various Trip Lengths
Trip Length (mi) Lightcraft Capacity (passengers)
5 2 1
12,000 $3530 $1815 $1243
10,000 $2958 $1529 $1052
8,000 $2387 $1244 $862
6,000 $1815 $958 $671
4,000 $1243 $672 $480
Figure 7 shows estimated group sizes for Lightcraft flights.
These are used to calculate the number of vehicles required
for each vehicle size. Distribution among the various craft sizes
is based upon the above estimates plus additional conditions
that 10% of the single passengers will team up to form doubles
and that 5% of the doubles will group to form four. (or five-)
member flights. Table 4 shows the number of daily revenue
flights necessary to service the passenger groups shown above.
These figures are based on 150,000 passengers per day, the
number corresponding to scenario B, and must be upwardly
adjusted to compensate for repositioning, spares, and peak
demand. Then, the fleet size can be calculated. Finally, capita/
expenditures can be estimated to show investment in fleet
according to traffic diversion, so that capital costs can be
estimated on a per flight basis.
The first adjustment that must be applied is for repositioning.
In our analysis, we have assumed that 50% of all flights must
be repositioned. This is conservative in light of most
o
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Fig 7. Assumed Passenger Grouping
automobile rental company experience, but provides a
reasonable worst-case scenario for estimating cost. As traffic
increases, the repositioning factor will eventually diminish to
a much smaller value (e.g., 5-10%), thus reducing costs with
a greater number of flights (this has not been taken into
account here). It is assumed that the energy costs for
retx_itiorting would be charged to the users. This will tend
to encourage passengers to fly to well-traveled areas, while
retaining the ability to fly nearly everywhere. The resulting
flights are as follows: 40,500 singles, 47,250 doubles, and
29,500 quintuples.
After adjusting the number of flights for repositioning, a first
estimate of the fleet size can be prepared, ignoring peaking
in demand and spares. Since the longest flight will take
approximately 45 minutes, Lightcraft should be able to fly
every 2 hours, leaving the remaining time for loading,
unloading, and any routine inspections or maintenance that
must be done. This results in 12 flights per day per Lightcraft.
The fleet size at this stage would be 3375 singles, 3938
doubles, and 2438 quintuples.
From this fleet size, the number of vehicles must be adjusted
upward to account for peaking in demand. The first reason
for doing so is that demand will be higher on some days than
others. Day of the week and month of the year will both have
an effect, let alone variations from year to year for a given day.
Peaking due to religious and national holidays can be ignored
Table 4. Daily Flights by Lightcraft Size in Year 20'
Group No. of 1 person 2 person 5 person
size passengers craft craft craft
! 30,000 27,OOO 3,000
2 60,000 28,500 1,500
3 37,500 12,750
4 15,000 3,750
5 7,500 1,500
Revenue Flights 27,000 31,500 19,500
'These 78,000 flights per day represent 150,000 flights per year and
15,000 payload tons lifted into space each day.
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because we are dealing with the entire world population.
Peakings in such demand will tend to offset one another. Non-
Christians, for example, will still be willing to travel on
Christmas, while non-Americans will want to travel on
Thanksgiving. The result will be that national religious holidays
will not have a significant effect on Lightcraft travel. Rather
than deal with these phenomena at a detailed level, a 300-day
year has been assumed. This means adjusting the fleet size
upward by a factor of 365/300, resulting in an approximate
20% increase. Once this number has been calculated, an
adjustment must also be made for spare& A 10% spare ratio
has been assumec[ This means 10% of the fleet will be out
of service for repair, implying the fleet size must be increased
by another 9%.
Finally, estimates must be made for the cost of the Lightcraft
vehides. This is perhaps the most dilficult task. In the long
run, with mass production, Lightcraft might become quite
inexpensive. For the time being, however, we have assumed
that today's typical business jet and propjet prices will pertain
(i.e., $250/1b). At $250/1b, the one-passenger Mercury
Lightcraft would cost $0.717 million, the two passenger
Gemini, $1.43 million, and the Apollo vehicle, $3.06 milhon.
Given these assumptions and calculations, Table 5 shows
that the five-person unit could actually become the cheapest
means of transportation in the long-distance travel market.
Even the single-capacity Merextry will be competitive with the
HSCT If so, the implications are tremendous. The Lightcraft
network might be capable of capturing the entire long-distance
international market, rather than just the 25% of the HSCT
market as we assumed. This would considerably change the
results presented here.
The final information presented in Tables 6 and 7 pertains
to the total costs involved. This is useful not only for showing
the capital expenditures required throughout the implemen-
tation of the Lightcraft network, but also for comparison to
the revenue estimates made previously. Using the same
discount rate of 10%, the values obtained from this table
should hold the same present value as those derived from
revenue estimates. The present values are important because
expenditures will precede revenues. Table 6 shows that capital
costs will occur over a period of 16 years, 4 years less than
the 20 years analyzed in the revenue estimates. The mainte-
nance and operating cost expenditures given in Table 7,
however, will logically coincide with revenue.
The total present value of costs for the Lightcraft system is
$12,982 million. This can be compared with net present value
of $15,923 million for the revenue estimate.
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the economic prosl_cts for a
revolutionary new aerospace transport system based upon the
Lightcraft technology, which, when operational, will enable
people to fly half-way around the world in 45 minutes. Based
on what we know to date, it appears the new technology will
be able to cover both its operating and capital costs, with at
least an 18% margin to spare, allowing ticket prices below any
other Mach 1 or higher transport options. Developers should
be encouraged to push Lightcraft prototype work through to
completion in the next half decade, because it is simply a
matter of time before this mode becomes the prindpal means
for long-distance international travel.
Figure 8 shows the number of satellite solar power stations
(SPSs) and launches per day needed to satisfy projected
demands for the Lightcraft network. The calculations assume
50% repositioning and a five-minute boost duration, 7GWe SPS
capacity with 40% laser-to-electric power conversion effi-
dency, and 90% beam transmission elfidency for continuous
global service. Note that in Year 20, 509 SPSs are required to
provide this service, which represents 25% of the total world
market. If the Lightcraft network captures the complete world
market, roughly 2000 SPSs will be required by Year 20.
It is interesting to compare this result with current 1989
U.S. and world energy consumption. The present U.S. ground
Table 5. Development of Costs per Passenger per Flight, by Lightcraft Size ( 1989 dollars)
12,000 $715,000 $71,500 $14,300 2,190 $39 $1,243 $1,282
I0,000 $715,000 $71,500 $14,300 2,190 $39 $1,052 $1,091
8,000 $715,000 $71,500 $14,300 $2,190 $39 $86 2 $901
6,000 $715,000 $71,500 $14,300 2,190 $39 $671 $710
4,000 $715,000 $71,500 $14,300 2,190 $39 $480 $520
(b) nvop, m_Ser _btcrafl
12,000 $1,430,000 $143,000 $28,600 2,190 578 $1,815 $947
10,000 $1,430,000 $143,000 $28,600 2,190 $78 $1,529 $804
8,000 $1,430,000 $143,000 $28,600 2,190 $78 $1,244 $661
6,000 $1,430,000 $143,000 $28,600 2,190 $78 $ 958 $518
4,000 $1,430,000 $143,000 $28,600 2,190 $78 $ 672 $375
( c) _ve passenger V#zcrafl
12,000 $3,052,500 $305,250 $61,050 2,190 $167 $3,530 $739
10,000 $3,052,500 $305,350 $61,050 2,190 $167 $2,958 $625
8,000 $3,052,500 $305,250 1161,050 2,190 $167 $2,387 $511
6,000 $3,052,500 $305,250 $61,050 2,190 $167 $1,815 $396
4,000 $3,052,500 $305,250 $61,050 2,190 $167 $1,243 $282
Trip Len Veh. Cost 10% Maint Rev F1/yr Cap Cost FI Oper. Cost Total/pax
(a) Single passenger iigbtcrafl
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Table 6. Lightcraft Capital Costs
Year Dvrm (%) Year (%) Singles Doubles Five-man Capital(Sift) PV($Mil)
1 11.73 11.73 522 610 377 2,397 221
2 19.89 8.16 364 424 263 1,668 140
3 29.28 9.39 419 488 302 1,920 146
4 39.28 10.00 445 520 322 2,044 142
5 49.29 10.01 446 520 322 2,046 129
6 58.81 9.52 424 495 306 1,946 112
7 67.46 8.65 385 449 278 1,767 92
8 74.99 7.53 336 392 242 1,540 73
9 81.31 6.32 281 328 203 1,291 56
10 86.41 5.10 227 265 164 1,043 41
11 90.39 3.98 177 207 128 814 29
12 93.39 3.00 134 156 97 613 20
13 95.58 2.19 97 114 70 447 13
14 97.12 1.54 69 80 50 316 8
15 98.18 1.06 47 55 34 216 5
16 100.00 1.82 81 95 59 372 8
Total 4455 5198 3218 20,441 1235
Table 7. Lightcraft Maintenance and Operating Costs
Year Dvrsn (%) Maim(Sift) PV($Mil) Oper ($iil) PV (Sift)
1 1.38 48 4 423 39
2 5.39 81 7 1,657 139
3 1.173 120 9 3,603 275
4 19.89 161 ll 6,110 424
5 2_28 202 13 8,996 567
6 39.28 240 14 12,068 692
7 49.29 276 14 15,143 789
8 58.81 307 15 18,067 856
9 67.46 332 14 20,723 892
10 74.99 353 14 23,037 902
!1 81.31 370 13 24,977 889
12 86.41 382 12 26,544 859
13 90.39 391 11 27,767 817
14 93.39 397 11 28,689 767
15 95.58 401 10 29,361 714
16 97.12 409 9 29,835 659
17 98.18 162 3 30,160 659
18 98.88 162 3 30,375 555
19 99.33 162 3 30,513 507
20 100.00 162 2 30,719 464
Total 5117 193 398,763 12,408
electric power grid supplies roughly 80 quadrillion Btu (i.e.,
QUADS), of which 85-90% comes from fossil fuel plants. This
power could be provided by 150 SPSs (e.g., 7 GWe each, at
the SPS; 65% transmission efficiency to groundbased receiving
antennae; 5 GWe into each of the grids)< 13>.
All U.S. energy needs (i.e., transportation, industrial,
domestic, etc.) could be covered by 500 SPSs Since world
consumption is 4 times that of the U.S., 2000 SPSs, spaced 40
to 50 miles apart in geostationary orbit would be needed for
the whole planet.
It is also usefid to compare the total payload moved per day
on the Lightcraft network, with that of the space shuttle orbiter
(65,0OO 113or roughly 30 tons maximum). Figure 8 shows that
in Year 20, 15,000 tons of paying passengers and ba_age will
be moved daily on the Lightcraft network This will be
equivalent to 500 shuttle launches each day. Fig. 8. Number of SPSs and launches per day vs. year
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